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In Encounter with Enlightenment, Robert Carter takes on a huge task; or rather, two 
huge tasks. The first is to sketch the history and development of ethics within 
Japanese traditions—particularly the great informing religious and philosophical 
traditions of Shinto, Confucianism and Buddhism, as they emerged within and 
diverged from a broader East Asian context. Second, after distilling from the amal­
gamation of these various streams a ‘core’ of Japanese ethics, the author proposes a 
number of specific ideas and ideals which alienated Westerners may fruitfully apply 
to their contemporary malaise. The first aim succeeds as well as may be possible in 
such a slim volume, while the second, more grandiose and, one might say, ‘theolog­
ical’ one provides an important perspective on the contemporary situation of com­
parative studies, though one that is not without serious flaws.
Robert Carter’s work often strides a fine line between academic scholarship and 
what might be called, without any negative insinuations intended, ‘popular’ Bud­
dhist writing. To his credit, like few others (Stephen Batchelor and Robert Thurman 
come to mind), Carter generally succeeds in maintaining a delicate balancing act 
between thoroughgoing analysis of Japanese culture and thought, and a more expe­
riential, even apologetic type of writing. However, the dangers inherent in such an 
approach to a topic already as large and complex as ‘Japanese ethics’ do surface 
from time to time in this otherwise quite solid introduction.
After a very personal introduction, where the author outlines the scope and intent 
of the book, the first chapter begins with a reflection on twentieth-century East-West 
studies, criticizing the conclusions of one of the foremost early comparative schol­
ars, Arthur Danto, who suggested that, at least with respect to morals, East and West 
are irreconcilable—due to insurmountable differences in ways of thinking about the 
world. Carter rejects such a notion as groundless, asserting that Danto fails to suffi­
ciently recognize the Gadamerian fusion of horizons that can and perhaps must 
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occur in any cross-cultural encounter. Chapter One moves on to a discussion of the 
Taoist notion of wu wei or ‘actionless action’, as the starting point for a truly 
‘Eastern’ being-in-the-world. Here, we find a sustained critique of Western dualism 
in favor of (Taoist) spontaneity and naturalness as well as (Taoist-Buddhist) inter­
connectedness as a basis for both social and environmental ethics.
The second chapter, where Carter speaks of the significance of Shinto for 
Japanese ethics, is in some ways the most interesting and fruitful of the book. As 
Carter notes, Shinto is often bypassed by modem writers on Japanese thought and 
Japanese values, perhaps because they are beguiled by the more obvious role of 
community-minded Confucianism or by Suzuki’s insistence on Buddhism (more 
specifically Zen) being the heart of all things Japanese. Here, we find a discussion of 
key terms like makoto (defined as ‘sincerity’, though this reviewer feels that such a 
translation is somewhat misleading, given the non-conformist and Romantic conno­
tations of that English term), as well as reflection on the essence of Shinto (or, to be 
more precise, pre-Buddhist Japanese religion) as a basic and simple experience of 
human kinship with others, the objects of the world and nature. All of this is a nec­
essary and useful counterbalance to the assumption that Shinto does not provide 
anything towards Japanese ethics. Yet the flaw in this chapter is a tendency by Carter 
and some of his sources to employ overly Hegelian-Idealist language in speaking of 
‘Shinto metaphysics’: “The world is, in this sense, God’s body; nature is kami made 
manifest, the subjective made objective as the form of the formless, the materializa­
tion of the immaterial, the invisible become visible” (p. 57). The metaphysical idea 
that there is something ‘out there’—before, beyond, above, extra—might be consid­
ered a distortion of the radical immanence presented by Shinto, at least according to 
most readings of the generally non-metaphysical ‘kami-cults’ which eventually 
became Shinto. At any rate, in the middle of the chapter, in a section called ‘The 
Way to the Future’, Carter makes an impassioned plea for the incorporation of a 
notion of ‘kami’ or something similar in ‘our’ (read: Westerners’) moral education.
Chapter Three deals with the impact of Confucian ideas on Japanese ethics. Here 
the concept of makoto is broadened to include the more relativistic (and pragmatic) 
awareness of “whatever standard of goodness reigns,” and the Confucian emphasis 
on the bonds between individuals and among members of a community, is given 
ample treatment. Though Carter wants to keep both Taoism and Confucianism in­
volved within the basic framework of Japanese (and ‘Eastern’) ethics, there is a clear 
preference in Encounter for the ideas of the former over those of the latter. While 
there has been, of course, considerable overlap and syncretism between these two 
ancient Chinese traditions over the centuries, there are still some points at which dis­
agreements, some fundamental, linger. Indeed, in some interpretations of Confucian 
‘virtue ethics’, one becomes good simply by acting good—thus radicalizing the 
Taoist (and Zen?) dichotomy of spontaneity/artifice or depth/surface. Moreover, 
one can find something similar to this idea within Japanese thought as well (see, for
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example, Kenko’s Tsurezuregusa “If you run through the streets, saying you
imitate a lunatic, you are in fact a lunatic. If you kill a man, saying you imitate a 
criminal, you are a criminal yourself. By the same token, a horse that imitates a 
champion thoroughbred, is a champion thoroughbred, and the man who imitates 
Shun belongs to Shun’s company. A man who studies wisdom, even insincerely, 
should be called wise.”) In short, it would seem that the many variant strands of the 
‘East’—strands that do not always harmonize—are not adequately acknowledged in 
Carter’s analysis.
Chapter Four, “Buddhism and Japanese Ethics,” lays out the basic ethical ideals 
coming from Indian, and especially Mahayana Buddhism. The discussion is a thor­
ough and useful summary of the core ideas of Buddhist ethics. However, while 
admitting that it is a ‘broad generalization’, the author again relapses into overly 
simplistic East-West binaries: “The most remarkable difference between ethics East 
and West ... is that the former encourages heart-felt feeling as the central core of 
ethical behavior and the latter precise formulation of a code of behavior, and the 
identification of some universal criterion of what is good (or right)” (p. 82). There 
are three problems here: first, as the author himself has noted, the ‘East’ is simply 
too large and diverse to be considered as one cultural sphere; second, the ‘West’, 
while arguably less culturally diverse due to the shaping force of classical culture 
and the Judeo-Christian and Enlightenment traditions, is nonetheless quite varied in 
its ethical ‘encouragements’; third, and perhaps most critically, what happens in this 
section is that Eastern ideals (Abhidharma, the Eightfold Path, Taoist philosophical 
monism, Confucian human-heartedness) are contrasted with Western realities (e.g., 
the idea that the Decalogue too-easily leads people to superficially “follow the letter 
of the law” [p. 83]). The notion that only Western cultures impose moral teachings 
simply does not stand up to scrutiny (that is, sociological scrutiny). In fact, when 
asked in a recent survey why they followed Buddhist practices, a vast majority of 
Burmese Buddhists replied that a) they were afraid of going to hell, and b) the 
Buddha made the rules. Sound familiar?
Chapter Five, “Zen Buddhism and Ethics,” is unsurprisingly situated as the heart 
of Encounter with Enlightenment. Carter begins by citing Abe Masao, who echoes a 
familiar Suzukian refrain in stating that Zen is, “in a fundamental sense, the basic 
source of all forms of Buddhism” (p. 99)—a statement which we might say is true 
only insofar as Buddhism is reinterpreted along Zen lines, thus providing a perfect 
case of circular reasoning. This is followed by a short summary of Zen’s claims to 
being ‘beyond words and letters’—complete with obligatory reference to the “finger 
pointing at the moon” and “map is not territory” tropes. Carter’s summary here 
would benefit from the recent work of Bernard Faure and Dale Wright regarding the 
rhetorical aspects of Zen language. In particular, the notion that language and expe­
rience are somehow opposed or can be so easily distinguished, is one that has of late 
been receiving the critical attention it merits.
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While the discussion of Zen and its contributions to ethics is familiar to those who 
have pondered the work of Suzuki or the Kyoto School, a fairly serious problem aris­
es here. Namely, where are the other denominations of Japanese Buddhism? Notably 
absent from Carter’s discussion are the Pure Land denominations (i.e., Jodo Shu and 
Jddo Shinshu), which can lay claim to being, by numbers at least, the most popular 
forms of Buddhism in Japan. The Pure Land approach to ethics is, in many ways, 
quite distinct from that of Zen, focusing (as with Protestant Christians) almost 
entirely on the saving grace of Other Power (in this case Amida Buddha, has made 
an original vow to save all sentient beings), thereby bypassing the Zen focus on 
emptiness, enlightenment and ‘being-in-the-moment’. Indeed, one of the most sig­
nificant modem works in Japanese religious thought, Philosophy as Metanoetics by 
the mid-century Kyoto School thinker, Tanabe Hajime, is an extended reflection on 
these issues from a distinctly Pure Land Buddhist perspective. One clear indication 
of Carter’s lack of acknowledgement of Pure Land traditions comes in the conclu­
sion to Encounter, where he suggests that while the West takes the “ordinary per­
son” as the standard for ethics, the East favors the “elite, exceptional” figure. 
However, as Ama Toshimaro has argued, Pure Land ethics is founded precisely on 
the standpoint of the “ordinary person” (see Ama’s article in this issue of The 
Eastern Buddhist). Another important denomination, Nichiren, has, in recent times, 
given birth to the extraordinarily successful ‘new religious movement’ called Soka 
Gakkai, which once again has views on ethics distinct from both Pure Land and Zen. 
While these traditions do share some features with Zen, the differences stand out— 
and deserve some attention in a book dealing with Japanese ethics.
At the end of this chapter, Carter makes note of Brian Victoria’s 1997 work Zen 
at War, which raised important issues regarding the commonplace understandings of 
Zen in the West, and which criticized Suzuki in particular for his contributions to the 
ideology of “Imperial Way Zen.” Yet this discussion, as with prior remarks on Con­
fucian-inspired Imperialism in Chapter Three and several paragraphs on Zen mili­
tarism near the end of the book, fails to go beyond the conclusion that “those who 
claim to know the teachings of their great founders simply do not understand after 
all” (p. 121). Besides Zen at War, recent works like Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The 
Storm over Critical Buddhism and Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School and the 
Question of Nationalism might be noted here to provide some philosophical depth to 
this vital issue. In particular, given the place Carter gives in this work to ‘pure expe­
rience’ (especially as developed by Suzuki and Nishida), it seems incumbent to 
reflect upon recent claims made by various contemporary writers in Japan and the 
West that it is precisely within this concept that we may find a clue to Japanese 
Buddhism’s occasional socio-ethical lapses.
Chapter Six, “The Fundamentals: Modem Japanese Ethics,” looks at the work of 
Watsuji Tetsuro (whose principal work in ethics, Rinrigaku has been trans­
lated by Carter). Watsuji’s work is indeed unjustly neglected vis-a-vis the Kyoto 
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School thinkers, and Carter has done as much as anyone to render his provocative 
ideas accessible to the English-speaking world. Watsuji’s clear acknowledgement of 
the influence of Confucian ideas on Japanese ethics allows for further discussion of 
the central place of makoto in such ethics, as well as Watsuji’s special focus on the 
status of ‘betweenness’ (aidagara') that he saw as the foundation not only of 
Japanese social interaction but as the very core of their being-in-the-world.
In Chapter Seven, Carter turns his attention to two modem Japanese thinkers, 
Nishida Kitaro and Yuasa Yasuo, as well as to Dogen, generally recognized as the 
greatest thinker of Japan’s 1500-year-old Buddhist tradition. The discussion of the 
modem philosophers revolves around what the author refers to as the “distinctive 
genius of the Japanese people, and the key to understanding the type of knowing that 
is deemed most important in that cultural tradition”—that is, the “ability to experi­
ence facts or things themselves” (p. 151). How did the Japanese acquire this aston­
ishing ability? By yearning to “become one in things and in events” (p. 151). Here 
Carter positively elucidates Nishida’s concept of ‘pure experience’, though this idea 
has come under the gun of late for being, among other things, a) borrowed from or 
heavily influenced by certain nineteenth-century Western thinkers like William 
James, thus not particularly Buddhist or Zen at all, and b) of dubious ethical effect. 
Indeed, to ‘Critical Buddhist’ scholars HakayamaNoriaki and Matsumoto Shiro, the 
Nishidan reliance on ‘pure experience’, however dressed up in Zen garb, seems to 
displace the clear Mahayana ethical imperative of compassion in favor of satori. 
Dogen is much more careful with respect to the place of enlightenment, and perhaps 
it is to his wisdom, rather than to his modem heirs, that we should turn to discover 
some answers to our contemporary problems. Whereas Nishida, along with Suzuki, 
and sometimes Carter too, seems to assume that the path to enlightenment will auto­
matically result in good actions, Dogen was astute enough to suggest that it may be 
out of our actions themselves that enlightenment emerges—or even that there may 
be ‘nothing to’ enlightenment beyond our actions themselves.
In conclusion, this book provides a good basic introduction to the sometimes 
overwhelmingly complex world of Japanese ethics. Carter’s focus on certain key 
terms like wu wei and mcikoto, in particular, helps to flesh out some of the more 
important themes within the Japanese value system as it has developed over the past 
two thousand years or more. The central problem with the work is that the shadow of 
Suzuki and the Kyoto School seems to hover rather largely over the proceedings, a 
shadow which—by allowing for dubious contrasts between ‘East’ and ‘West’, as 
well as a general tendency towards a monolithic, that is to say, Zen/Idealist, vision 
of Japanese culture—ultimately limits the interpretive and critical power of En­
counter with Enlightenment.
Certainly, Carter is superior to Danto, Suzuki, or the Kyoto School thinkers when 
it comes to questioning ‘East-Westism’, not least in his humility and genuine con­
cern with developing connections between various traditions, but he hedges his bets, 
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and, in reiterating their tropes about, for instance, the West’s “analytic mind” 
(thereby neglecting not only the mainstream religious traditions of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, but also modem secular streams like Romanticism), ulti­
mately falls back into their stifling embrace. As John Maraldo has put it in his cri­
tique of Suzuki: “We look for diversity and historical conditioning in religious 
expressions, not for a privileged experience that might be the unchanging core of a 
tradition. The attempt to express a core in ‘Western’ as well as ‘Eastern’ terms finds 
sympathy no longer” (John C. Maraldo, “Questioning Nationalism Now and Then: 
A Critical Approach to Zen and the Kyoto School,” in Heisig and Maraldo, eds., 
Rude Awakenings, p. 340).
For all Carter’s well-intentioned caveats, it would seem better, at this stage in the 
game, for comparativists to drop the whole ‘East-West’ construction altogether, as 
being a) an outdated product of colonialism and orientalism, b) methodologically 
geared towards oversimplification and c) deeply infused with ideological and ethni- 
cist if not racialist assumptions (witness Yuasa’s remark about the “deep structure of 
the Japan’s [sic] ethnic collective unconscious,” p. xv). Carter himself admits that 
there are in fact “many Easts and many Wests” (p. 5). Why then not simply speak of 
‘Japanese ideals’ and, if necessary, compare and contrast these with, for instance, 
‘modern Euro-American ideals’ (or better, ‘post-Enlightenment Euro-American ra­
tionalist ideals’)? Maybe because doing so would water down the rhetorical-polem­
ical force that has been a prop for East-West studies for over a century. Carter’s 
work would stand much taller without the prop.
MINDFULNESS IN THE MARKETPLACE: COMPASSIONATE RE­
SPONSES TO CONSUMERISM. Edited by Allan Hunt Badiner, with a 
foreword by Julia Butterfly Hill. Berkeley: Parallax Press, 2002. Pp. xvi + 
310, with endnotes, list of contributors and credits. ISBN 1-888375-24-8
SEAN DUKE
Is there any connection between increasing meat production, drought and interna­
tional starvation? How might we view the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Trade Organization and our own lifestyle in light of the Buddhist precepts? What 
does Buddhism have to do with the end of the world and “B movies”? In Mind­
fulness in the Marketplace, we can find the answers to these questions and much 
more.
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